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Bayesian cognitive science sees the mind as a spectacular probabilistic inference machine. 
But Judgment and Decision Making research has spent half a century uncovering how 
dramatically and systematically people depart from rational norms. This paper outlines recent 
research that opens up the possibility of an unexpected reconciliation. The key hypothesis is 
that the brain neither represents nor calculates with probabilities; but approximates 
probabilistic calculations through drawing samples from memory or mental simulation. 
Sampling models diverge from perfect probabilistic calculations in ways that capture many 
classic JDM findings, and offers the hope of an integrated explanation of classic heuristics 








Human probabilistic reasoning gets bad press. Decades of brilliant experiments, most notably 
by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; 
Kahneman, 2011) have shown a plethora of ways in which we get into a terrible muddle 
when wondering how probable things are. Every psychologist has learned about anchoring, 
conservatism, the representativeness heuristic, and many other ways we reveal our 
probabilistic incompetence. And creating probability theory in the first place was  incredibly 
challenging, exercising great mathematical minds over several centuries (Hacking, 1990). 
Probabilistic reasoning is hard, and perhaps it should not be surprising that we often do it 
badly. The whole field of Judgment and Decision Making (JDM), and its cousin Behavioural 
Economics, takes this view as a starting point.  
Oddly, though, human probabilistic reasoning equally often gets good press. Indeed, many 
psychologists, neuroscientists and AI researchers believe probabilistic reasoning is, in fact, 
the secret of human intelligence. Indeed, one particularly important element of probability, 
Bayes’ theorem, has come to name an entire subfield: Bayesian cognitive science (e.g., 
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths & Goodman, 2011), spawning probabilistic models of 
perception (Kersten, Mamassian & Yuille, 2004), categorization (Anderson, 1991; Lake, 
Salakhutdinov & Tenenbaum, 2015; Sanborn, Griffiths & Navarro, 2010), reasoning and 
argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2020), and intuitive 
physics (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013; Sanborn, Mansinghka, & Griffiths, 2013). 
In parallel, neuroscientists have conceived of the brain as a Bayesian inference machine 
(Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao, 2007). Bayesian methods are also widespread beyond 
psychology---from economics  (Karni, 2011) to philosophy of science (Howson & Urbach, 
2006). 
What is going on? How can two of the most important and influential research programs in 
psychology be built on entirely contradictory assumptions? If the human mind is a 
spectacularly powerful probabilistic inference machine, why do we fall into systematic and 
elementary probabilistic errors? 
There are various approaches to resolving this puzzle (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). For 
example, we might propose that low-level, modular, repetitive processes (vision, motor, 
language processing) are Bayesian, but high-level, effortful, general purpose, central 
cognitive processes are not. Alternatively, or additionally, we might suspect that the Bayesian 
brain operates only on data gathered by the senses; and cannot deal with explicit probability 
problems formulated in words or symbols.  
We are sympathetic to these viewpoints, though noting that, when performance is measured 
in the same way, there is surprising similarity between low-level and high-level processes 
(Jarvstad, Hahn, Rushton, & Warren, 2013). But is there a more direct approach? The 
Bayesian account of cognition can’t be taken literally, even where it is most successful. For 
example, a literal Bayesian approach to vision would require calculating the myriad 
probabilities of each possible layout of the environment, given a particular visual input, by 
applying Bayes’ theorem. But these calculations are astronomically complex. So Bayesian 
computational models, and presumably the brain itself, can only be approximating optimal 
Bayesian calculations: for complex, real-world, problems, human rationality can only be 
bounded, i.e., restricted by computational constraints (Simon, 1955; Gigerenzer & Selten, 
2002; Lieder & Griffiths, 2019; perhaps using heuristics corresponds to Bayesian inference 
with extreme priors, Parpart, Jones & Love, 2018).  
Any approximation will, inevitably, generate mistakes—this is what makes it an 
approximation, after all. Reconciliation of JDM and Bayesian cognition would be possible if 
the way the brain approximates Bayesian calculations generates the very errors and biases 
that JDM has uncovered.  
A very natural and simple way of approximating Bayesian calculations, and one that is 
widely used in computational statistics and machine learning (so-called Monte Carlo 
methods), maps naturally onto the parallel hardware of the brain (Buesing, Bill, Nessler & 
Maass, 2011; Orbán, Berkes, Fiser & Lengyel, 2016), and builds on well-established 
psychological processes of memory retrieval and mental simulation. Rather than attempting 
implausibly complex mathematical calculations using the laws of probability, the brain needs 
only to sample from a model of some aspect of the world (Bonawitz, Denison, Griffiths & 
Gopnik, 2014; Griffiths, Vul & Sanborn, 2012; Sanborn & Chater, 2016)---and, often, 
sampling is easy, even if Bayesian probability calculations are incredibly hard. If the brain 
could sample forever, then, in certain circumstances, the frequencies of the sample will come 
to match the “true” probabilities arbitrarily accurately. But, in reality, the size of the sample 
might be very small--- perhaps even just one instance, in some cases (Vul, Goodman, 
Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2014). Hence the sample will only give a rough clue about the 
“correct” probabilities---but still this clue may be enough to help the brain make “good 
enough” decisions. The results of the sample can then be converted into choices or 
judgements. Indeed, assuming a small sample that is then converted into either estimates of 
probability or into confidence intervals has successfully explained how overconfidence 
effects strongly depend on how participants are asked to respond (Juslin, Winman, & Hanson, 
2007). 
Deriving probabilities from frequencies drawn from samples is reminiscent, but very different 
from, the frequentist interpretation of probability familiar from classical statistics associated 
with Fisher and Neyman (Hacking, 1990). While Bayesians interpret probabilities as 
subjective degrees of belief of a particular agent or person, frequentists aim for a more 
“objective” interpretation of probability in terms of limiting frequencies of repeated 
experiments in the external world (e.g., flipping a coin), which is independent of the 
individual. Sampling models in cognitive science are inherently tied to the psychology of the 
individual, depending on the individual’s probabilistic model from which the sample is 
drawn---thus, different agents, with different internal models (or items retrieved from 
memory), will assign different probabilities to the same event. Thus, while sampling models 
involve frequencies, these frequencies approximate the subjective probabilities familiar to 
Bayesians, particularly those of unique events, rather than embodying a frequentist 
interpretation of probability.  
There is, though, an important distinction between cognitive models that apply “raw” relative 
frequencies, based on a mental sample (e.g., Costello & Watts, 2014), and those which take a 
Bayesian approach a step further (e.g., Zhu, Sanborn & Chater, 2020), by integrating samples 
with background knowledge (in the spirit of Bayesian Monte Carlo in machine learning, 
Rasmussen & Ghahramani, 2003). This difference is especially important when sample sizes 
are small. But before exploring the distinctions between sampling models, we first make 
broader comparisons between sampling and the heuristics and biases literature. 
 
Rethinking probabilistic irrationality: From the matching law to “heuristics and biases” 
The sampling viewpoint predicts a variety of recalcitrant patterns of apparently irrational 
behaviour. Consider probability matching: the tendency for people to predict the next item in 
a sequence in proportion to its probability, rather than always picking the most probable next 
item (e.g., Koehler & James, 2009). Suppose the true probability of Heads is 2/3 and Tails is 
1/3. Always choosing the most probable option (Heads) will be correct with probability 2/3. 
But matching, i.e., predicting Heads 2/3 of the time and Tails 1/3, will be correct with 
probability (2/3).(2/3) + (1/3).(1/3) = 5/9. Several authors have pointed out (e.g., Vul, et al., 
2014) that, while sub-optimal, matching make sense if we assume people draw a single 
sample and simply follow that prediction.  
A second consequence is that people will over-estimate items that are readily available in 
memory or to mentally simulate. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) found that words beginning 
with k are judged more frequent than words with k as the third letter, although they are much 
less common---because the first letter provides a much stronger retrieval cue, as would be 
expected from models of lexical access (e.g., Marlsen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980). And when 
judging the number of paths through a maze, they showed that judgements are strongly 
influenced by how easily the paths can be found (i.e., sampled through mental simulation). 
From this present viewpoint, Tversky and Kahneman’s “availability heuristic” is not a 
specific type of shortcut---but a side-effect of sampling.  
Or suppose we want to estimate whether HHHHHH or THTHHHT has the greater probability 
of being generated by a fair coin. If we could draw, say, a few thousand samples, we’d 
conclude that the sequence of length six, HHHHHH, has a relative frequency of about (1/2)6 
=1/64; and that the sequence of length seven, THTHHHT, a relative frequency of about (1/2)7 
=1/128. But if we draw a few samples (e.g., of different lengths) it is unlikely that either 
sequence will be reproduced exactly. This type of problem can be addressed by so-called 
Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC, Beaumont, 2019), used for real world problems 
(e.g., with speech waves or images), where the chance of sampling an exact match with the 
data is close to nil. ABC counts up samples which are “close enough” to the data, by some 
similarity measure. Assuming that one unstructured mix of heads and tails is judged similar 
to another (irrespective of sequence length); and very dissimilar from a “pure” sequence of 
heads, we’ll (wrongly) conclude that many more samples are similar to THTHHHT than 
HHHHHH. Thus, sampling, combined with independently testable assumptions about 
similarity, provides a novel explanation of the origin of the representativeness heuristic 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972): that the probability of an item is judged by its similarity with 
respect to a category samples (whether lawyers or engineers, or sequences of random coin 
flips). Again, according to the sampling viewpoint, representativeness operates not as a 
specific mental short-cut (i.e., a specific representativeness heuristic), but as a side-effect of 
judging probabilities by drawing mental samples to a “tolerance” based on similarity. Of 
course, this approach depends on psychological assumptions about similarity---but these can 
be independently evaluated.  
So far, we’ve ignored a crucial aspect of sampling: often we can’t easily draw independent 
samples from our probability distribution---but it is possible to draw a stream of samples, 
each of which is a variant on the last. Under certain conditions then, if we sample long 
enough, we can “fill out” the whole probability distribution, as our stream of samples 
gradually explore the whole distribution—and this is the justification for this method, known 
as Markov Chain Monte Carlo, invented at Los Alamos laboratories (Metropolis, Rosenbluth, 
Rosenbluth, Teller & Teller, 1953). MCMC is now a workhorse of Bayesian computational 
models, including models of cognition---but it is also a psychologically natural hypothesis. 
After all, our memories and our imaginations operate mostly by small “jumps” (Hills, Jones 
& Todd, 2012)---retrieving or simulating a specific item tends to “prime” psychologically 
similar items (this point is also captured in non-Bayesian sampling models, Costello & Watts, 
2018).  
Dasgupta, Schulz and Gershman (2017) note that, if the brain uses small, correlated samples, 
as generated by MCMC, then the resulting probability judgments will be powerfully affected 
by the starting point. Suppose we wonder what proportion of animal species live in Africa. If 
we are prompted to begin with lion, then our next few samples might be the semantically 
similar zebra, antelope, giraffe, and hippopotamus, all of which happen also to live in Africa, 
thus biasing our estimate upwards. If, by contrast, we began with squirrel, or polar bear, our 
sample, and hence our estimate, might be very different. All these effects would disappear if 
we sampled forever---we’d rove about our entire representational space of animals 
eventually. But judgments need to be made quickly, from manageable, small, samples.  
Such effects of starting point explain a wide variety of nuanced effects, including otherwise 
puzzling “unpacking effects” (e.g., Sloman, Rottenstreich, Wisniewski, Hadjichristidis & 
Fox, 2004). For example, when people judge the probability of an event represented as a list 
of disjunctions of typical instances, this probability is inflated. For example, the probability 
of food poisoning, stomach flu, or any other gastrointestinal disease is judged to be higher 
than the probability of the logically equivalent gastrointestinal disease. But when the 
disjuncts are atypical the opposite effect arises. Thus, the probability of gastroenteritis, 
stomach cancer, or any other gastrointestinal disease is judged to be lower than the 
probability of the logically equivalent gastrointestinal disease, though logically equivalent. 
The intuitive insight behind Dasgupta, Schulz and Gershman’s model is that priming the 
sampling process with typical examples will help people generate or recall examples of the 
category by starting the search process in parts of the search space with a high proportion of 
category members. But priming the sampling process with atypical examples will hinder the 
generation of examples by starting process in parts of the space with a lower proportion of 
category members.  
Dasgupta, Schulz and Gershman (2017), and Lieder, Griffiths, Huys, and Goodman (2018), 
also demonstrate that this process leads to yet another of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1974) 
celebrated heuristics, anchoring and adjustment: that judgments are biased in the direction of 
a suggested starting point. Thus, in estimating the number of countries in the UN, we will 
draw samples from a probability distribution over possible values---but we will be biased by 
the starting point suggested by an ‘anchor’ number, even where that anchor has been 
generated by a random process (e.g., a roulette wheel) and is clearly objectively irrelevant.   
The heuristics and biases program captures a broad range of phenomena in a set of distinct 
heuristics. The Bayesian sampling approach aims, by contrast, to explain these phenomena as 
arising from different aspects of a single process: accumulating, and drawing conclusions 
from, samples (whether from memory, or an internal model). So, for example, the availability 
heuristic arises directly from some samples being more accessible than others; anchoring 
from the local, correlated nature of sampling; and representativeness heuristic from the fact 
that we can typically only expect to draw samples that are similar, not identical, to a given 
outcome. But the sampling approach also has distinctive implications, such as that averaging 
repeated estimates by a single person should outperform any single “best guess,” because 
people are repeatedly sampling from their own belief distribution (as shown by Vul & 
Pashler, 2008), and that these biases will disappear if people are given the time and 
motivation necessary to draw a large enough sample. 
Probability judgement by sampling 
A particularly direct test of the Bayesian sampling viewpoint is to ask how well it captures 
people’s explicit probability estimates. Our starting point is an important (but non-Bayesian) 
sampling model by Costello and Watts (2014), which provides an excellent fit to a variety of 
results. They begin with the assumption that people draw samples, from memory or other 
sources; and read off probabilities from the frequencies of different outcomes. But, crucially, 
they suggest that the sampling process is imperfect. Thus, trying to estimate how likely it is to 
snow on Christmas day, we may misremember some snowy Christmases as snow-free, and 
the reverse. This mechanism produces a simple mechanism for explaining why small 
probabilities tend to be over-estimated, for example. Suppose the probability of Christmas 
snow is 10%, and suppose that a person happens to sample 1 snowy and 9 non-snowy days 
from memory. But if, say, 20% of days are misremembered, then it is likely that about two of 
the non-snowy days may be recalled as snowy, thus boosting the estimated amount of snow. 
The effect reverses when we estimate highly probable events, such as non-snowy days. Thus, 
they explain the widely observed tendency for probability estimates to be pulled away from 
the extreme values (e.g., Erev & Wallsten, 1993). 
Psychologists have, of course, proposed many other possible explanations for aversion to 
extreme probabilities. Prospect theory, for example, assumes that decision weights are 
transformations of explicitly presented probabilities that demonstrate aversion to extremes 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and there are other approaches that also assume noisy 
processing produces aversion to extreme probabilities (e.g., Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 
1994; Hilbert, 2012). Costello and Watts note that their sampling approach forces judgment 
biases to be symmetric because the chance that a sample is mis-recalled is the same for any 
event. So if our mis-recalled sample tends to overestimate snowy days, it would also 
underestimate non-snowy days, to just the same degree. Extending this line of thinking, 
Costello and Watts created a list of probabilistic “identities” over pairs of events, some of 
which they have shown match human judgment data surprisingly well, and others from which 
the human data substantially deviates. These reliable matches and mismatches between 
human judgment and probability theory form a challenge to non-sampling models of 
probability distortion, as Costello and Watts (2014, 2016, 2018) have shown how a sampling 
model captures both the distortions and the patterns, in human probability judgments—
showing that these judgments are, as they put it, “surprisingly rational” after all, and 
irrational judgments are the result of noise.  
 
 (HIGH DEFINITION VERSION OF THIS FIGURE ATTACHED AS A SEPARATE FILE) 
Figure 1. Experimental data and model predictions for probabilistic identities of icy- and 
frosty-related weather events. Participants were asked to judge individual weather events in a 
random order, responding to questions of the form “What is the probability that the weather 
will be [event X] on a random day in England?”. Their weather probability estimates, labelled 
“P(event X)”, were then combined into probabilistic identities whose calculations are shown 
along the y-axis. The expected values of identities are shown in bars with 95% confidence 
intervals across participants. Probability theory predicts the expected value for each identity 
should be zero. The overlaid dots are best-fitting model predictions for three models (green 
squares: a “baseline” relative frequency model [i.e., simply the proportion of samples with a 
particular property], blue triangles: the probability theory plus noise model, developed by 
Costello and Watts; and red dots: the Bayesian sampler). This figure is adapted from Zhu, 
Sanborn, and Chater (2020). 
Zhu, Sanborn and Chater (2020) show that a number of identical mean predictions can be 
derived from an even more “rational” model, the “Bayesian sampler.” Zhu, Sanborn and 
Chater’s starting point is that, with small samples, reading off relative frequencies can’t be 
quite right. To illustrate, with a single sample, every event would have a probability of 1 (i.e., 
1 out of 1) or 0 (0 out of 1). Instead, we need to moderate these extremes by combining them 
with reasonable prior assumptions---treating the sample itself as data (as in Bayesian Monte 
Carlo, Rasmussen & Ghahramani, 2003) that should update prior assumptions. The effects of 
the prior are substantial for small samples, but, like the effects of starting point or 
autocorrelation discussed above, disappear for large samples. The natural Bayesian 
Bayesian Sampler
Relative Frequency
Probability Theory plus Noise
P (icy) + P (frosty) − P (icy and frosty) − P (icy or frosty)
P (icy) + P (frosty and not icy) − P (frosty) − P (icy and not frosty)
P (icy) + P (frosty and not icy) − P (icy or frosty)
P (frosty) + P (icy and not frosty) − P (icy or frosty)
P (icy and not frosty) + P (icy and frosty) − P (icy)
P (frosty and not icy) + P (icy and frosty) − P (frosty)
P (icy and not frosty) + P (frosty and not icy) + P (icy and frosty) − P (icy or frosty)
P (icy and not frosty) + P (frosty and not icy) + 2P (icy and frosty) − P (icy) − P (frosty)
calculation here is extremely simple (linearly pulling probabilities away from the extremes) 
and perfectly mimics Costello and Watts’s mean predictions. It is more “rational” as the 
deviations from probability theory result from using this prior to improve probability 
estimates based on a small number of samples. Zhu, Sanborn and Chater (2020) show that the 
Bayesian sampler has distinctive predictions for conditional probabilities, where events are 
correlated (e.g., Pr(icy | frosty), where samples of frosty days will typically also be icy). This 
is because the Bayesian sampler directly samples from conditionals, rather than constructing 
conditionals from samples, and their empirical data support their model. Another source of 
potential differentiation between the models concerns the reporting of extreme probability 
values. Assuming sample sizes are reasonably small, Costello and Watts’ model predicts that 
all samples will (or will not) be instances of the event of interest---so that probabilities of 0 
and 1 will be reported. The Bayesian sampler, by contrast, assumes that all probability 
judgments will be “shrunk” by Bayesian correction, so that 0 and 1 values should not be 
reported, except through occasional response error, or when generated through reasoning 
rather than sampling (if judging Pr(A or not-A), which is clearly 1 through logical analysis 
alone). Exploring the prevalence of 0/1 probability judgments is therefore a promising 
direction for future research to distinguish between these sampling models.  
The prospect of reconciliation? 
The development of sampling models as psychological hypotheses provides a possible 
reconciliation between two apparently diametrically opposed traditions in psychology and 
neighboring disciplines. Perhaps the rational models of Bayesian Cognitive Science and the 
apparently non-rational findings of JDM research arise from a single source: a probabilistic 
mind based on sampling. If this is right, then both of these important research traditions may 
benefit from closer interaction. Data from JDM, behavioural economics, and the gamut of 
apparent errors and biases across cognitive and social psychology, might turn out not to 
undermine rational models, but to provide crucial insights into how Bayesian probabilistic 
calculations are approximated by the brain. Moreover, a Bayesian sampling framework may 
provide a unified and integrated perspective for apparently unrelated heuristics and biases. It 
is too early to say how broad and deep such unification might be. But we suggest that initial 
indications are sufficiently promising to suggest that the possibility of reconciliation should 





Costello, F., & Watts, P. (2014). (See References). This paper outlines a sampling-based 
theory of probability judgment, where samples are sometimes misclassified leading to 
systematic biases.  
Dasgupta, I., Schulz, E., & Gershman, S. J. (2017). (See References). Shows how starting 
points matter in cognitive models drawing small, correlated, samples from memory.  
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are gathered generate a wide variety of, often counterintuitive, biases in JDM and social 
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judgment and decision making research from one of its pioneers. 
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